From a pure legal theory approach this article could have been written in the seventies or, to be more precise, from the moment the EEC gained exclusive powers in some of the fields of activity of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). If it had been written then, the principal conclusion would have been that the EEC should become a member of the FAO in its own right. More detailed assertions in the article would have been considered as no more than a cry in the dark.
In fact, the phrasing of die question 'why was die accession of die EEC to die FAO necessary?' is implicitly based on the point of view of classical international law according to which only states are capable of becoming members of international organizations. This stands in contrast with Community law according to which, under die appropriate conditions, die Community should act on its own in international relations.
Therefore, I would suggest that die question should be phrased differently, and in die following terms.
Why is die Community not a member of international organizations which are active in fields of the Community's exclusive competence, and why are die Member States still members of these organizations although they have already transferred their competence on die matter to die Community?
The legal justification for die Member States to remain active members of die FAO exists as long as die Community does not have an exclusive competence over die major fields of activity of the FAO.
However, accession of one international organization to anotfier is still die exception in international institutional law. Therefore, it is useful to examine die necessity of such an accession from both die point of view of die member organization (EEC) and die target organization (FAO).
From die point of view of Community practice, die Treaty establishing die EEC entrusts die Commission of die European Communities with die task of negotiating, on its behalf, all binding commitments under international law (Article 228 of die Treaty of Rome). Conventions under the auspices Of llMn imtifinfll nfpaiiiyatinTK ITP <'>ppn open only tO llfcCHN*f I ^ Of "W g
Furthermore, only members can take part in the body or conference which is drafting the text of a convention. As early as 15 December 1971, the Commission informed the Council in a note about the insufficiency of the Community's observer status in the FA0.5 According to the Commission, die Community could not bible any proposals, did not take part in the policy mniring of (jjg organization, and was not able to fully participate in trrhrricul bodies established in the framework of the FA0.6 Although in practice the Community stretched its observer status to its TngTimiiin, it is evident that the Commission could better fulfil die function of representing die Community and negotiating on its behalf in other international organizations with die authority of a member, rather than from die limited position of an observer: -From die FAO perspective there are some important advantages to be gained from admitting die Community as a member. It advances the cooperation between the organizations, and in die light of die powers of the EEC in fields of action of the FAO, its admittance as a member most certainly contributes to the fulfilment of the objectives of the FAO.
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The participation of die Community as a full member brings with it legal certainty concerning die fulfilment of obligations and liability in die event of their breach. The EEC is committed to die activities pursued by the FAO, and with it all its Member States are so committed (Article 228(2) of die Treaty of Rome). In particular, in fields of die exclusive competence of die Community some Member States of the EEC had great difficulties in implementing certain FAO decisions, if measures had not been taken at die Community level.
Cooperating with the Commission of die European Communities is more efficient since die Commission is best informed about Community policies and, in fields of competence of die Community, the Commission may speak on behalf of the whole Community. Finally, by acquiring rights of a member, die EEC is able to exercise its influence from inside die FAO and bring with it its expertise on die activities of die FAO.
Thus, once die necessity of accession of one international organization to another is established, die legal solution can be found in die form of an amendment to die constitutive instrument of die receiving organization concerned. However, die situation is not that simple since under die rules and practice of international organizations, die admittance of any member is largely a discretionary issue in die hands of die Member States, and is therefore a political rather than a legal matter.
However account must be taken of die reluctant attitude of relevant parties; these are die Member States of die EEC and third parties uiat are members of die FAO and die FAO as an organization. The Member States of die EEC are very reluctant to give up any aspect of their sovereignty, in particular in die field of external relations. This is also reflected in die relatively limited express competence of EEC far external activities under the Treaty of Rome. As for tibird parties, in die past die most consistent opponents of die EEC were die Eastern bloc countries. Nowadays, following die radical change in East-West relations, one may expect less resistance in relation to die EEC position as an international actor. However, die growing rivalry with die USA and Japan as demonstrated, for example, by their objections to die accession of the Van Commnnity to the FA0.8 might continue to be an obstacle bjodenng tbe EEC to f|>1 "* up its appropriate position is an international actor.
From the tide of tbe FAO tbe problem was quite complicated, since tbe FAO belongs to the classical type of organization mat admits only states as members. The FAO belongs to the UN family, where the relatively weak position of the EEC in the organs of the UN also had an influence on the EEC chances of becoming a member of a UN Specialized Agency. Finally, it may well be that in a UN organization there is a fear of setting a precedent once the rules are changed, since the rest of the "family'of UN organizations are governed by similar rules.
The capacity of the EEC to become a member of the FAO depends on three main factors, namely the possession by the EEC of an international legal personality, 9 the powers of the EEC under Community law, and the requirements of the FAO constitutive document Thus, from Community law perspective the problem is that, although the EEC has a variety of external powers to act in fields of FAO's activity, it lacks an explicit power in order to accede to another international organization. The situation with regard to accession to international organizations is somewhat different from treaty-making by the EEC because different lands of treaties are involved. Accession to international organizations is not merely a question of concluding a contract treaty but it also requires a concluding constitutive treaty. The latter establishes an international organization and therefore is of broader scope than a contract treaty. In addition, it normally sets certain conditions for accession.
The problems with regard to accession of the EEC to an international organization create an interesting interaction between the law of international organizations and Community law. From the perspective of die law of international organizations, once an organization has taken the decision permitting membership, the Community can accede as soon as they fulfil the conditions set by the other organization followed by a decision of the competent organ of the organization concerned. However, from the Community law perspective, in the absence of explicit powers to accede to other international organizations, it is not possible to apply the provisions on the treaty-making power of the EEC to accession to international organizations. There are several possible solutions for this legal problem.
The power to accede to the constitutive treaty of another international organization can be based on the theory of implied powers, as has been developed by the European Court of Justice.
17 The test of necessity should be satisfied in order to support an interpretation of implied external powers.
Thus, a Community act approving the accession to the FAO can possibly be based on implied powers. The power to accede to the FAO should derive from the totality of explicit 13 rnmmfrri^lpnlH-y-npninn ) /7fl Imtertymjf^ff} A gf r*f»' "" N<ttuml Ruhhr This provision presents the conservative approach of granting an observer status for other international organizations. In die case of the FAO the status granted is not even a permanent observer position but is dependent on an optional invitation from the Conference. The content of cooperation with other organizations may be (Vfrr"""^ by an agreement. 2^ Thus, according to the Constitution of the FAO the EEC could be granted no other status than that of a nonpermanent observer. Consequently, the only legal way to admit the EEC as a member was by an amendment to the Constitution. The amendment procedure is expressly provided pwW Article XX of the Constitution. 27 The original Constitution has been modified more than 15 times in the past 28 At the 26th session of the Conference important amendments to the FAO Constitution were adopted allowing the accession of REIOs to the FAO as members. From the Community's perspective, the Council decision on the official request for accession functioned equally as the Council decision authorizing the accession itself, since no further Council decision was taken. Furthermore, the decision of the Council was made at a stage when the results of the accession negotiations between the Community and the FAO were already known. A more appropriate procedure would have been to conclude an accession agreement with the FAO to be approved by the Community institutions, Le. by a Council decision sui generis, as is usual for accession to other multilateral treaties. The admission of the Community to the FAO without the conclusion of any accession agreement between the two organizations means that the procedure of Article 228 of the Treaty of Rome for the conclusion of agreements was not followed. As a consequence, h became more difficult to apply for an opinion of the European Court of Justice as to the compatibility of the Constitution of the FAO, which the Community accepted, with Community law. As will be shown, 34 there are some serious question marks over the limitation of competence of Member Organizations of the FAO and their compatibility with the external and internal competence of the EEC To conclude, the accession of the Community to an international organization is still an exception both in international institutional law and in Community law. Consequently, the procedure for such an accession is not well developed. The procedure for the accession of the EEC to the FAO was affected by special circumstances in that both the application of the Community for membership and the amendments to the FAO Constitution authorizing it were approved in the same FAO session.^ in future cases, the adherence to a constitutive treaty by the Community should find its expression in internal Community procedures. This should be done by two distinct Council decisions. First, a decision should be made authorizing the application for membership and the opening of accession negotiations, then a second decision should authorize the actual accession as approved by the other organization; the latter measure being necessary for the purpose of the Community internal legal order. It is also proper that in such a significant Community activity the role of the European Parliament be guaranteed by making the assent of the European Parliament an obligatory element for a Council decision on accession to another international organization.36 Further, in order to open the way for judicial review on the compatibility of such an accession, there should be an accession agreement concluded between the Community and the target organization.
IV. The Amendments to the FAO Constitution with Regard to Membership of REIOs
Already at this stage one can reflect on some effects of the EEC membership of the FAO, although the future practice of the relations between these two organizations will certainly
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See the discmtion infra text section IV.
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(X»M(91)387final,180ctoberl991,5^,poina6,7;F(xex^pleRukXIX(l)oftbeCtener«lRulcj of the FAO provides that the fbnnal instrument of application for membership should reach the Director-General not later than the opening day of the Conference session at which the admission of the applicant is to be considered. The 26th session of the FAO Conference was opened on 9 November while the EEC Council decision to apply for accession was taken on 25 November. Consequently the EEC application could not have reached the Director-General before the opening of the session. One has to conclude that the FAO showed a certain amount of flexibility with its rales of procedure by allowing the EEC to apply for irw-mhifOrip at the 26th session. Strictly spoking the rules could have obliged the EEC to wait another two yean until the 27th session of the Conference. 36
In the case of accession of the EEC to the FAO the European Parliament was only consulted see: COM (91) 387 final 18 October 1991.8, footnote 1; OJ C 326.
reveal more problematic issues. The main amendments to the FAO Constitution which were necessary to allow EEC membership, and indeed the membership of other REIOs, are analysed below.
A-Membership of a REICH Mixed or Dependent Membership?
Article II of the FAO Constitution on membership has been nmrpfo* in the following manner. Paragraph 3 lays down that REIOs may apply for membership. Paragraph 4 lays down the conditions under which an REIO may become a member of the FAO. First, the majority of the Member States of the REIO should be members of the FAO. Second, the REIO should possess competence, transferred to it by its Member States, on matters dealt with in the FAO. Third, it should be able to take decisions on these matters which bind its Member States.
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A very important principle is laid down in Article II paragraph 3, namely that any reference in the FAO Constitution to Member States applies in principle to Member Organizations unless otherwise provided. 38 This principle is important, in particular, as a guideline for legal interpretation of the rules of the FAO. When in practice questions arise as to the status of Member Organizations, the assumption will be that it brings with it the same rights and obligations as the status of Member Nations, unless otherwise specifically provided. The question arises as to what extent the Constitution imposes specific limitations on rights and obligations of Member Organizations in comparison with rights and obligations of Member Nations. Does it go so far as to turn the above mentioned principle into a mere declaration with very little legal effect?
Article 11(3) lays down the principle of equality of members of the FAO. In the same article a specific reservation is placed on Member Organizations, namely that the field of application of this principle is limited by Article 11(8). Paragraph 8 stresses the principle of attributed powers. A REIO may act within the FAO in the limits of its competence. The presumption in Article 11(8) is that the REIO and its Member States will always share competence in the fields of activity of the FAO.
This becomes clear from the first part of Article 11(8):
A Member Organization shall exercise membership rights on an alternative basis with its Member States that are Member Nations of the Organization in the areas of their respective competences (...)
Thus, membership of a REIO is always a 'mixed membership', ix. combined with the membership of its Member States. First, membership is possible only under the condition that the majority of the Member States of the REIO are members of the FAO (Article 11(4)). Second, the exercise of rights of membership should be divided between the REIO and its Member States according to their respective competence (Article 11(8) REIO becoming a member itself. But the membership of the RHO, which is a distinct legal person, is dependent on the requirement that the majority of its Member States are members of theFAO. If a* REIO fulfils both the requirements, namely that at least in some fields of action of the FAO competence was transferred to it from its Member States, and that it has the competence to take binding decisions for all its Member States in these fields, the REIO can function as a member in its fields of competence. Why is it relevant, as a condition for membership, that a majority of its Member States should also be members?
From a strict legal perspective the requirement for concurrent membership of Member States to the REIO is not correct A political explanation for this requirement is that third parties fear that the Member States of an RElO could obtain rights through the REIO, while not being members of the organization. Given the requirement of the FAO Constitution that the REIO as a Member Organization should have the competence to take binding decisions for all its Member States, the result is that Member States of a* REIO which are not Member States of the FAO would receive, through their membership in die REIO, both the rights and the obligations of FAO membership. Therefore, the fear of Member Nations is unfounded. This so-called 'free rider' view is based on the unfounded idea that Member States of an REIO obtain only rights through the REIO, whereas in law the REIO is a distinct personality. Legal analysis and perceived political reality do not parallel in this matter. is theoretically possible that at a further stage of integration the Community will acquire exclusive powers over the major issues dealt with in the framework of the FAO. In such a case, h is legally not acceptable for Member States to give their support to such a clause, which has the effect of preventing the Community from becoming a member on its own without the majority of the Member States. Where the Community is exclusively competent, it follows from the caselaw of the Court of Justice that such a clause would be inconsistent with Community law. 4 ** In any case such a clause would interfere with me powers of Community institutions because their decision on membership would be dependent upon, and could thus be frustrated by, a decision of Member States concerning their own participation. Thus, for future cases of EEC accession to international organizations I would suggest an analogous solution to that which"was formulated for the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. Under this Convention, if the REIO takes all the obligations upon itself, whether or not h exercises concurrent competence in order to do so, it can participate alone.
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B. Declaration on the Dtvtston of Powers
Article 11(5-7) of the FAO Constitution requires that an REIO acceding to the FAO must supply a list of the powers transferred to it from its Member States. Any powers not mentioned in this' list will be assumed to belong to the Member States. All members of the FAO are entitled to demand a clarification of the division of powers on specific subjects, and by virtue of new rule XLJ of the General Rules, the Member Organization and its Member States are under an obligation to supply such information. More procedural arrangements are regulated under rule XLL For example, paragraph 2 lays down that before each session of the FAO, the division of powers in relation to all questions to be discussed and the division of voting rights should be declared by the Member Organization or its Member States. Furthermore, under paragraph 3 of the same rule a distinction is made as between two stages: in the first stage, Le. during a debate, both the REIO and its Member States may participate. Whereas in the second stage, i.e. when taking a decision, the session will only take into consideration the remarks of the party who has voting rights. These procedures are so complicated that it is doubtful whether they will be successfully applied in practice.
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The requirement for a declaration on the division of powers between the REIO and its Member States is a common practice with regard to mixed agreements. 43 Following this model, it is also a requirement with regard to a mixed membership in an international organization such 
V. Condnstons
It has now become clear that the legal problems relating to the accession of the EEC to the FAO were surmountable. A legitimate question is why did it take so long for the EEC to become a member of a Specialized Agency? A purely legal answer is inappropriate since there are political factors involving the Member States of the Community, the Member Nations of the FAO and the organization itself.
From the perspective of the FAO, the EEC with its variety of external powers fulfils the requirements for accession. From the Community law perspective, the EEC has the necessary powers to act in tbe framework of the activities of the FAO. However, it lacks a specific power to ynakr an internal Community decision on iwefision to another international organization, Le. it lacks the treaty-making power for concluding or adhering to a constitutive treaty. As long as the Treaty of Rome is not nmf'W in such a manner as to grant the Community express powers to accede to international organizations, the capacity to do so should be based on a broad interpretation of tbe external powers authority, both explicit and implied powers, which the Community has in fields of activity of the FAO, eg. Articles 43 and 113 of the Treaty of Rome. The Member States may remain members of the FAO only if die Community does not have exclusive competence over the major fields of action of that organization.
In summary, the amendment to the FAO Constitution to allow the accession of REIOs marks an important step in the relationship between the EEC and the FAO and constitutes an 34 The participation in sessions of the Conference is guaranteed for the EEC m Member Organiratinn owing to tbe fact that the Conference is a plenary organ. The Council on tbe other hand is composed of 49 rlrf in] members which most be rt«ren from Member Nations. In tbe case of tbe EEC the practice is that tbe EEC has 'seat No. 50* and in such a manner it is a permanent participant in sessions of the Council, provided that some of its Member States are elected members of the FAO Council. The EEC accession to the FAO is very significant because it can create a precedent to be followed by other UN bodies. However, I do not consider the model of membership of REIOs in the FAO in its present form as a suitable standard to be followed by future accessions of the EEC to other international organizations. Given the evolving character of EEC competences, one can predict even at this early stage that further amendments to the Constitution of tbe FAO will be necessary in order to open the way for independent membership of REIOs, with all the rights and duties that such membership may imply.
